This study shows that the size effect can be explained to a large extent by a measurement error in beta. The measurement error results from a change in financial leverage during the beta estimation window. Based on simulations of asset returns, we document that the size of the bias in equity returns is proportional to marketinduced changes in leverage, as suggested by Modigliani and Miller (1958) . We propose a point-in-time beta that incorporates the leverage at the end of the beta estimation window rather than the average leverage during the estimation window. Using the point-in-time beta to compute expected returns for a sample of historical stock returns, we document that the size effect sharply decreases. In contrast to previous explanations of the size effect, our approach does not introduce market frictions or additional risk factors. It is consistent with the risk-return considerations in standard capital structure theory. 
Introduction
The size eect, as originally reported in the empirical studies by Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981) , has been covered extensively in the asset pricing literature. The observation that small stocks outperform large stocks poses an anomaly of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), apparently contradicting the notion that expected excess returns are solely explained by their covariance with the returns on the market portfolio. Fama and French (1992) and Fama and French (1993) also emphasize that neglecting the size eect, while relying on the CAPM's main prediction that dierences in betas 1 explain the cross-section of expected returns, may lead to substantial pricing errors in asset pricing tests.
Given that the true underlying beta is unobservable, most empirical tests of the CAPM rely on the estimation of single security betas or portfolios betas over a period of three to ve years. These tests implicitely assume that the estimated beta is an unbiased predictor of the true beta. The previous literature describes possible biases in the estimated beta, ranging from data deciencies (e.g., thin or asynchronous trading and survivorship biases) to stochastic eects. However, little research has focused on the bias thatnancial leverage introduces to beta estimation. The aim of this study is to close this gap.
We document using simulated returns for size-sorted portfolios that the estimated beta is a biased proxy for the point-in-time beta at the end of the beta estimation window. This measurement error in betas leads to biases in expected returns, and the bias is particularly pronounced for small rms.
Accordingly, the size eect should not entirely be regarded a CAPM anomaly, but it is at least partly an artifact of the estimation technique used in virtually all empirical studies. The bias results from changes in nancial leverage during the beta estimation window. Specically, changing leverage leads to a downward bias in the estimated beta that is used to compute expected returns.
In the case of risk-free debt, the impact of nancial leverage on a rm's equity beta is described by Modigliani and Miller's (1958) famous proposition II. Based on Hamada (1972) , our analysis provides a correction for the bias in beta estimation. Adjusting the beta for changes in nancial leverage during the beta estimation window, we are able to substantially reduce the size eect for both simulated and market data. The abnormal returns of small rms (many of which are past losers) become statistically insignicant in both cases. Overall, our study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we provide evidence that the commonly used methodology for estimating beta creates a bias in expected returns for past losers. Second, we document that the size eect is attributable to measurement errors in betas. Finally, we suggest a simple correction for this bias and show that a point-in-time beta is able to substantially reduce the size eect.
There are a few earlier studies that are related to our analysis. Bhandari (1988) documents that leverage explains dierences in cross-sectional returns even after correcting for size. However, he does not provide a model for why one should expect these dierences and how big they should be. Moreover, he adds additional degrees of freedom to his regressions, which are not required in our simulation framework. Bhandari (1988) concludes that nancial leverage should be an additional explanatory variable. Somewhat dierent, we do not argue that the debt-to-equity ratio is a proxy for risk that is independent from market risk. Instead, the change in leverage during the beta estimation window produces a biased proxy for the point-in-time beta at the end of the window. In other words, the abnormal returns are attributable to higher beta risk, which is induced by higher nancial risk. Ferguson and Shockley (2003) also report a bias in the estimated beta and a pricing error, which are a function of a rm's leverage. However, their argument is dierent from ours. They suggest that the bias stems from using an equity-only portfolio as a proxy for the true market portfolio. In our analysis, we observe a size eect even if the true market portfolio (at least as dened in our simulation setup) is used. Moreover, Ferguson and Shockley's (2003) correction of the bias requires adding new explanatory factors. Hecht (2002) investigates the size and book-to-market eects on asset returns and equity returns. He documents that both eects are only signicant on the equity level (and not the rm level), and hence he concludes that they must be induced by leverage. Charoenrook (2004) conrms these ndings using a larger sample. He further notes that any time-variation in the beta will cause an error-in-variables problem in the second pass of a Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression, but he does not investigate the magnitude of this bias.
Our study addresses the time-variation in beta and provides evidence for the eect of leverage on excepted returns. In contrast to Charoenrook (2004) , we assume risk-free debt, and hence we need not rely on an appropriate specication of Merton's (1974) capital structure model. The specication of a pricing model for debt represents a potential error source because it requires to assume maturities and risk premiums. For example, Charoenrook (2004) assumes that the maturity of a rm's debt is the weighted average of all bonds outstanding. This assumption implies that debt never falls due (because average duration exceeds the maturity of the debt with the shortest maturity), and hence it neglects the risk of default for equity holders.
In order to demonstrate that the size eect shows up independent from any bias in the data sources, we choose a simulation approach. Our simulation framework is based on two fundamental assumptions: (1) the CAPM holds unconditionally for rms' asset returns, and (2) debt is risk-free. The rst assumption allows isolating the eect of nancial leverage on the timevariation of the equity beta. With a constant asset beta, any variation in the 3 equity beta must be induced by leverage. The second assumption avoids the pricing of debt claims in a rm's capital structure. Any mispricing in debt would spill-over to equity returns, and hence any test becomes a joint-test of the eect of leverage on equity returns and the validity of the pricing model for debt.
Our results are complementary to Charoenrook's (2004) earlier ndings.
Without specifying a pricing model for debt, we nevertheless observe an eect of leverage on expected returns. Even more important, our simulation excludes a variety of alternative explanations, such as investor irrationality, thin or asynchronous trading, data quality, survivorship bias, choice of the wrong market portfolio, missing risk factor, premia for liquidity or estimation risk, higher moments or trading costs. Presumably, all these eects do aect equity returns, but they are not necessary to generate a size eect.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the necessary theoretical foundations. Section 3 describes our simulation framework, and section 4 presents our testable hypotheses. Section 5 discusses the simulation results, while section 6 applies our suggested correction for the point-in-time beta on U.S. stock market data. Finally, section 7 concludes and provides an outlook for future research.
Theoretical foundations
A variety of explanations have been suggested to explain the size eect. Financial leverage is put forward as one potential explanation. Most important, starting from Modigliani and Miller's (1958) proposition II, Hamada (1972) derives a relationship between a rm's leverage and its equity beta. Assuming risk free-debt, the equity beta, denoted as , is just the levered version of the rm's asset beta, labeled :
where is the debt-to-equity ratio. However, the relationship in equation (1) alone cannot explain the size eect because nancial leverage should already be reected in the estimated equity beta. Galai and Masulis (1976) develop an option pricing model that allows investigating the eects of the capital structure on a stock's systematic risk. They argue that a stock's 4 systematic risk is the product of the rm's systematic risk and the price elasticity of the equity value with respect to changes in the rm's asset value.
Based on Merton's (1974) model, the equity beta is not only a positive function of leverage, but also a negative function of the risk-free interest rate, the variance of the asset returns, and the time to maturity. Galai and Masulis (1976) derive the following generalized version of equation (1), relaxing the assumption of risk-free debt:
DeJong and Collins (1985) use the Galai and Masulis (1976) framework to identify the sources of beta instability. In line with equation (2), they document that rms with higher leverage exhibit greater beta instability. They attribute higher residuals for high leverage rms in market model regressions to capital structure factors. However, they do not investigate the unbiasdness of the estimated beta. Using bond and equity data, Hecht (2002) analyses the cross-section of rms' asset returns. Compared to stock returns, he nds the patterns of book-to-market, reversal, and momentum eects to be less pronounced or non-existent in asset returns. He concludes that capital structure plays a major role in producing these eects. In a theoretical analysis, Charoenrook (2004) documents that Fama and MacBeth (1973) estimates are systematically biased in the presence of leverage. This bias is caused by the assumption that factor loadings are constant during the estimation period, and it leads to a relationship between expected stock returns and the book-to-market ratio and size, respectively.
Our paper adds to this strand of research by investigating the magnitude of the bias in the beta estimation that is caused by market-induced changes in leverage. We use a simulation approach with risk-free debt, as assumed in Hamada (1972) and described in equation (1). Simulating risky debt requires a pricing model for debt, and hence mispricing of debt would immediately cause mispricing of equity. We rather choose a simulation approach to create a clean-room sample that excludes many other explanations for the size eect, especially those pointing towards data deciencies. For example, Roll (1981) argues that thin-trading causes the size eect. Thin-trading is clearly an observable eect in market data, but in our simulation setup no return is subject to thin or asynchronous trading. We also exclude any survivorship bias in our simulated returns (Kothari et al., 1995) and use the true market portfolio in the beta estimation (Roll and Ross, 1994; Ferguson and Shockley, 2003) to avoid possible mean-variance ineciencies of the market portfolio proxy. No other risk factor can inuence our results. For example, Amihud and Mendelson (1989) partly attribute the size eect to a liquidity premium, and the ndings in Chan et al. (1985) point to a distress factor. Keim (1983) documents a relation of the size eect with the January eect. Klein and Bawa (1977) analyze the problem which investors face when the distribution of securities' returns has unknown parameters. In this case, estimation risk occurs, and hence investors will hold a portfolio that diers from the mean-variance optimum. Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) investigates investors' preference for higher moments of the return distribution. Finally, Berk (1995) argues that any missing risk factor will be proxied by rm size due to discounting eects. All these factors are excluded from our simulation framework, and hence they cannot drive our results. Our ndings are also unaected by data snooping (Black, 1993) .
We model equity returns in the presence of nancial leverage starting from asset returns based on a constant asset beta. In other words, we simulate equity returns for partly debt nanced rms, assuming that the CAPM holds unconditionally for rms' asset returns. Even in this simplistic simulation setup, we observe a size eect as described in the prior literature. Therefore, we conclude that the size eect is caused endogenously within our simulation and identify the changes in leverage during the beta estimation window as the source of this bias. In a closely related paper, Choi (2009) uses market data and comes to similar conclusions based on the price elasticity of equity with respect to asset returns implied by equation (2). He also documents that the size and book-to-market eects are partly caused by nancial leverage.
Moreover, we propose a simple correction for the bias in the estimated beta. The beta estimated over a 60 months time window, denoted as 60 , represents the average leverage, 60 , during the estimation period rather than the leverage at the end of the estimation window, . Based on equation (1), we derive the asset beta, denoted as , from dividing 60 by 1 + 60 for each decile portfolio. Assuming that the asset beta does not change during the estimation period, we use the leverage at the end of the estimation period to estimate a point-in-time equity beta, denoted as :
Correcting the estimated beta for leverage changes during the estimation window removes the size eect in simulated data and reduces it substantially 6 using market data. However, both equation (1) 3 The simulation setup
In our empirical framework, we simulate the market value of assets, denoted as , , for all rms ( = 1, ..., ) with a given amount of debt, denoted as , . The market value of equity, labeled , , is the residual:
Given the simulated equity values, we are able to compute equity returns and to examine whether a size eect shows up in the simulated data. The proper choice of the processes for changes in , and , is essential. Specically, the parameters must be chosen such that no size dependency is induced and that the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) holds for asset returns.
As
, and , are linearly dependent, any size dependency in the process for the market value of debt will spill over to the simulated equity values. For example, if debt returns increase with asset size, this leads to higher equity returns for smaller rms. However, this size eect is articially caused by the process for the return on debt.
The goal of our simulation analysis is to demonstrate that the size eect is endogenous in the estimation of equity betas. In order to avoid any biases that result from the pricing model for debt, we choose the simplest possible setup: debt is assumed to be risk-free and of zero maturity. Accordingly, the market value of debt is equal to its face value at any time. Risk-free debt implies that a rm can be liquidated at no cost. As soon as the rm's asset value falls and becomes equal to the face value of debt, it will be liquidated immediately and its debt will be fully repaid. As debt has zero maturity, its value is also unaected by changes in the risk-free interest rate. With debt being risk-free and of zero maturity, the market value of debt equals its face value at any point in time, and hence debt is always correctly priced. (Merton, 1974) . Our analysis indicates that nancial leverage changes the moments of equity returns. The same is likely to be the case for asset returns in the presence of operating leverage, but our analysis is restricted to nancial leverage. We assume that the CAPM holds unconditionally for asset returns. Accordingly, there is an unobserved market portfolio, and asset returns are proportional to their covariance with the returns on this market portfolio. By construction, the covariance with the market portfolio is the only source of expected returns. With a zero risk-free interest rate, the expected asset return for zero-beta rms is also equal to zero. Assuming that there is idiosyncratic volatility in asset returns, the correlation between the return on the market portfolio and asset returns is imperfect. Therefore, the instantaneous continuously compounded asset return for rm i at time t, denoted asˆ, , , is given as:
The process in equation (5) consists of normally distributed rm-specic idiosyncratic returns, denoted as · , , and normally distributed returns 1 We run all simulations with time-varying risk-free interest rates using different stochastic processes. The results remain virtually unchanged. Intuitively, equity returns are increased by the amount of the risk-free rate, and in estimating beta we again subtract the risk-free rate and work with excess returns. Therefore, the interest rate cancels out, and its stochastic process has no influence on our main results. , captures the linear dependency of asset returns from market returns similar to an asset beta.
The term −0.5 · 2 ensures that the expected discrete idiosyncratic return equals to zero. Therefore, in line with the CAPM, covariance with the market portfolio is the only source of expected asset returns.
We simulate instantaneous continuously compounded returns. Discrete returns cannot be normally distributed as assumed by the CAPM because the largest loss an investor can realize is 100%; however, the normal distribution supports the entire real line. In contrast,ˆ, , is normally distributed due to its linear dependency on , (which are rm-specic independent standard normal random numbers) and on , (which are independent standard normal random numbers that capture innovations of the market portfolio).
We set the parameter , equal to one for all rms, ensuring that any differences in the cross-section of equity returns are caused by dierences in leverage and not by dierences in asset betas.
Asset values are simulated over a period of time. Therefore, we need to dene a continuously compounded asset return, labeled ,[ , +1], , which translatesˆ, , into a return in nite time:
According to equation (6), ,[ , +1], is equal toˆ, +1, if the asset value is greater than the value of debt during the entire time interval. However, if at any point during this time interval the rm's asset value drops to the value of debt, hence if the asset return is ln( ) − ln( ), then ,[ , +1], will also be equal to ln( ) − ln( ). Equation (6) ensures that the continuously compounded asset return during an arbitrary time interval from to + 1,
, is in line with our assumption of risk-free debt. If the check for liquidation was only made at the end of each period, asset values could potentially fall below the face value of debt. However, this loss incurred by lender contradicts our assumption that debt is risk-free.
In contrast to our simulation setup, with risky debt high equity returns would be derived if shareholders play a risk-shifting game at the expense of debtholder. While risk-shifting may potentially cause excessive equity returns if the market value of debt drops below the face value and asset values are being redistributed from debtholders to sharholders, our simulation results document that supposedly abnormal returns even occur in the absence 9 of risk-shifting. Therefore, using the returns generated by equation (5) would dramatically increase the eect observed in our simulation. Another important property of our setup is that equation (6) does not add a trend to asset returns. Ifˆhas an expected value of zero, then ,[ , +1], also shows an expected rate of return of zero independent of the choice of leverage.
Allowing for risky debt requires an explicit model to evaluate debt. The market value of debt would no longer be equal to its face value, and hence the return on debt would not be equal to the risk-free interest rate. Any return anomaly for equity returns could potentially be caused by errors in the model for the value of debt. Accordingly, our simulations would be a joint test of the size eect and the model for the value of debt. By allowing for immediate default (even within a given time interval), we ensure that debt is always correctly priced, and hence no pricing error in the valuation of debt can inuence equity returns.
Our assumption of zero maturity debt is convenient from a mathematical point of view, but it also seems to be realistic from a practical standpoint.
Most rms use current accounts and liquidity lines for their cash management.
2 As soon as their asset value drops below the notional amount of total debt, their current account and any other access to the money market will dry up, and hence rms will default on lack of liquidity. This may even be the case in the presence of other tranches of debt with longer maturities. In fact, the time of default is likely to be triggered by debt with the shortest time to maturity, and in many instances this is daily revolving debt.
Unfortunately, our approach in equation (6) comes at a price. It implies that the distribution of asset returns needs to account for path dependency, as illustrated in gure 1. In order to estimate the probability density of an asset value at the end of the period, , +1 , we need to integrate of over all possible paths leading to this point from the starting value, , . We employ the path integral laid out by Feynman (1948) . Because no solution to the path integral in equation (6) exists, we solve the problem numerically by slicing each period into 1, 000 time slices and check for default at the end of each time slice. The high number of slices ensures that the pricing kernel is approximated with sucient accuracy and that any remaining losses to debtholders are negligible compared to the observed eects in equity returns.
We use the continuously compounded return from equation (6), 
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Figure 1: In the absence of debt, the distribution of log asset values at = 1 would be described by the blue normal distribution. However, for leveraged firms the distribution changes. The asset value cannot fall below the value of debt as this will lead to immediate liquidation. The red distribution takes this path dependency into account. There is a very high probability of a loss of −0.5, expressed as the total market value of equity in units of standard deviation, because many simulation paths will fall below the debt level at least temporarily. The lilac path is above the debt level at = 1, but it will never reach this level as the firm will be liquidated at = 0.1, i.e., when it drops to the level of debt. For large positive returns the differences to the normal distribution are small and the distributions are asymptotically identical.
to calculate the change of asset values from time to + 1 as follows:
Given that the expected asset return is positive, rms will either be liquidated if they reach the debt barrier, or they will grow large enough to render the level of debt negligible, hence avoiding the risk of default. Therefore, we need a rule to keep leverage in a plausible range and force the simulation to converge to a distribution with realistic debt ratios. Specically, we assume that the simulated rms will pay a dividend if their leverage, labelled , and measured as the rm's debt-to-equity ratio, falls below 0.5.
dividend subsequent to an increase in equity values will be nanced by the issuance of new debt, and the amount to be issued and distributed is chosen such that leverage is exactly 0.5 after the dividend has been paid. The trigger level is set such that the resulting average leverage ratio for the largest size decile will approximately match the empirical leverage ratio in the largest size decile of US rms (which is approximately 0.652 according to Compustat Global Database). In order to increase the debt-to-equity ratio to the target leverage of 0.5, the dividend, denoted as , , must be as follows:
The (·) function ensures that dividends are only paid if leverage falls below the target. 4 The choice of the dividend payment does not strongly inuence the results of our simulation because our primary interest is on high leverage rms (i.e., mainly small rms with negative past returns). These rms do not reach the lower trigger for leverage, and hence they do not distribute dividends. For debt-to-equity ratios above 0.5 all changes in leverage are induced by equity returns. The payment of dividends occurs at the end of each period [ , + 1] during which the trigger level has been reached.
Dividends are paid to shareholders and increase their total equity returns, denoted as ,[ , +1], . Because dividends are nanced by debt, the level of debt is increased by the same amount, and hence we have:
The novel idea of our simulation analysis is to show that there is an endogenous relationship between the market value of equity and the rm's leverage. In order to make sure that this size eect is really endogenous, we choose the starting values for the simulation such that there is no relationship between a rm's market value of equity and its leverage at the beginning of 4 To see that this simple rule implements the desired target leverage, assume that = 2, = 10, and hence = 12. According to equation (8), the dividend is 3 − = 4 − 2 = 2. After the dividend has been paid out, = 2 + 2 = 4, = 10 − 2 = 8, and = 4 8 = 0.5. the simulation. Therefore, we have:
,0 = · 2,
,0 = + ,0 .
In order to generate dispersion in leverage ratios, denotes equally distributed random numbers in the interval from zero to one. By drawing the random variates for the starting values of equity, ,0 , independently from the starting values of leverage, ,0 , we ensure that there is no correlation between these two rm characteristics at the start of the simulation, and hence any size eect must be endogenous. By choosing the values for equity and leverage, we also determine the starting values for debt, ,0 , and total assets, ,0 .
Finally, we construct the return on the market portfolio, labelled , , as the cross-sectional value-weighted average of all simulated equity returns. Ferguson and Shockley (2003) argue that using an equity-only proxy for the market portfolio may cause a size bias in the estimated equity betas if the rms' equity returns covary with the omitted assets from the market portfolio. However, this problem should not be important in our simulation setup because equities are the only return-generating securities. The return on the market portfolio is given as:
Based on the framework described in this section, we are able to simulate a set of rms with specic asset returns, debt-to-equity ratios, and equity returns. It allows us to examine whether the size eect shows up in this very general distribution of equity returns and is inherent in the underlying return structure.
Testable hypotheses
We use simulated equity values and equity returns to examine whether the size eect shows up in our clean room sample. Following Reinganum (1981) We also record the subsequent portfolio returns over the period to + 1.
Portfolios are formed in each simulation month , and the average return and average beta are computed for each decile over time. As there is no size specic factor in our simulations, we expect that each size portfolio has the same average beta and exhibits the same average return. Accordingly, we formulate the rst two testable hypotheses:
Hypothesis H1: The average estimated betas of all size portfolios are equal.
Hypothesis H2: The average estimated returns of all size portfolios are equal.
In case hypotheses 1 and 2 do not hold, and given that the CAPM holds for asset returns by construction, we expect that any cross-sectional variation in returns can be explained by variation in betas. This leads to an alternative testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis H2.a: There is a linear relationship between average estimated portfolio returns an average estimated betas.
Equation (13) ensures that leverage is independent of the market value of equity across rms at the start of our simulations. The market value of equity changes, and hence leverage also changes along each simulation path.
Therefore, we test if the average leverage is still equal across all size deciles:
Hypothesis H3: The average leverage is equal across all size deciles.
As Modigliani and Miller (1958) point out, we should expect higher equity returns for rms with higher leverage (nancial leverage). If hypothesis 2.a does not hold, we expect that leverage (at least partly) explains the deviation from the linear relationship between average estimated returns and average estimated betas. as averages across all firms. They are normalized such that the standard deviation is always equal to one, which simplifies a comparison of the shape of the distributions.
, , are the continuously compounded asset returns, while , , and , are the discrete equity and market returns, respectively. , , and , are the continuously compounded equity and market returns, respectively, which are calculated as = (1 + ). For the moment calculation all infinite equity returns are removed from the sample.
The eect is dierent for continuously compounded equity returns. They exhibit an increased kurtosis of 4.667 (instead of 3, which is implied by a normal distribution). However, there is little asymmetry in the simulated returns. Both skewness and the fth moment are close to zero. The signs of the uneven moments become negative, while they are positive for asset returns in the presence of leverage. Equation (6) introduces a positive skew to asset returns; they can grow unlimited but have a oor at ln( ) − ln( ) on the downside. In contrast, for continuously compounded equity returns there is no oor on the downside, as an asset return of ln( ) − ln( ) implies an equity return of −∞. While the probability of an ever increasing return converges to zero, the probability of a return of −∞ is larger than zero and nite. Although we remove all innite returns from the sample for the purpose of moment calculation, the remaining eect is strong enough to reverse the positive skewness in asset returns. Without debt all returns are normally distributed, and hence we conclude that the skewness in returns is a function of a rm's leverage. Transformed into discrete returns the skewness 60 denotes the beta estimated using the returns from the prior 60 months.
is the average point-in-time beta estimated according to equation (3), and is the corresponding asset beta.
∅ 60 (∅ 60 ) is the average leverage (equity value) during the beta estimation period, and ∅
is the average leverage (equity value) at the end of the beta estimation period. The columns labeled PE contain the average pricing errors based on the different beta estimates. Pricing errors are multiplied by 100. ADR denotes the average "default" rate, hence the percentage of firms with an equity return of less than −90%. For the pricing error columns the numbers in brackets are t-values for the hypothesis that the error equals zero. All other numbers in brackets are standard errors.
stock returns. The returns of small cap stocks are too high to be explained by the dierences in betas, and hence we observe a CAPM anomaly in the smallest size deciles. While excess returns are high for the smallest rms, the pricing error is only small for the larger rms. Table 2 further indicates that in the bottom half of the decile portfolios containing small cap stocks the average market capitalization at the end of the beta estimation period ,denoted as ∅ , is smaller than the average rm capitalization within the beta estimation period, labeled ∅ 60 . For the top half of the decile portfolios containing large cap stocks the relationship is the other way round; on average, the size at the end of the estimation period is larger than within the period. This implies that sorting rms by market capitalization implicitly sorts rms by past returns. Presumably, small rms have a higher probability of having suered from prior negative returns, and large rms have a higher probability of having experienced prior positive returns.
In our simulations rms pay a dividend if leverage falls below 0.5. Firms with positive returns and hence lower leverage can counterbalance the marketinduced changes in leverage by paying a higher dividend. In contrast, small cap stocks cannot react to changes in market leverage. Consistent with the empirical evidence for price run-ups prior to equity issuances (Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Chang and Dasgupta, 2009 ), our simulation setup prevents rms from raising fresh equity to compensate past losses. This eect results in increasing leverage for past losers and, violating hypothesis 3, in a correlation between leverage and rm size. sample seem to do little in the short-run to counterbalance these marketinduced changes in leverage. Bessler et al. (2008) report similar results for European rms. They also show that managers do little to rebalance leverage in the short-run and even tend to exacerbate market-induced changes by issuing stocks after stock price increases, apparently in an attempt to time the market.
Given that small cap stocks, on average, suer from a negative performance during the estimation period for 60 , their market capitalization at the end of the estimation period is smaller than the market capitalization at the beginning of the estimation period and the period average market capitalization. Another implication is that leverage at the end of the estimation period is higher than the period average leverage. Modigliani and Miller (1958) establish a direct link between leverage, nancial risk, and expected returns. While 60 is estimated over all 60 time intervals and reects the risk of the average leverage during the estimation window, the expected return in the next period is proportional to the rm's leverage at the end of the estimation window. A problem does not occur as long the average leverage is a good proxy for the period-end leverage. However, Table 2 indicates that this proxy becomes increasingly bad for the small decile portfolios. As a result, the estmated beta becomes less accurate for these small capitalization portfolios and suers from a downward bias. In fact, for the smallest decile the average leverage in the estimation period is only about 65% of the leverage at the end of the period, which is (at least partly) responsible for the size eect. Neverthless, past market returns are not solely responsible for the correlation between size and leverage. In fact, even within a given size decile leverage impacts beta estimation and pricing errors. Specically, we split the 19 smallest size decile portfolio into ten subdecile portfolios according to their market value of equity as shown in Table 3 . Even within this subsample of bad performing stocks the size eect is still observable, and equity returns decrease with size. Again, the size eect is most pronounced in the smallest two subdeciles. Both portfolios exhibit a high excess return of roughly 1.4% per month, which is more than 0.4 percentage points higher than expected based on the estimated 60 . This observation is in line with the ndings by Fama and French (2007) that the size eect is caused by the migration of extremely small rms (microcaps) with extremely high returns. Knez and Ready (1997) Table 2 is further split into ten subdeciles. Decile 1 contains the microcap firms with the smallest market value of equity, and decile 10 contains the microcap firms with the largest market value of equity. is the average discrete excess equity return over the risk-free interest rate. Returns are multiplied by 100.
60
denotes the beta estimated using the returns from the prior 60 months. is the average point-in-time beta estimated according to equation (3), and is the corresponding asset beta. ∅ 60 (∅ 60 ) is the average leverage (equity value) during the beta estimation period, and ∅ (∅ ) is the average leverage (equity value) at the end of the beta estimation period. The columns labeled PE contain the average pricing errors based on the different beta estimates. Pricing errors are multiplied by 100. ADR denotes the average "default" rate, hence the percentage of firms with an equity return of less than −90%.
For the pricing error columns the numbers in brackets are t-values for the hypothesis that the error equals zero. All other numbers in brackets are standard errors.
Looking at the smallest subdecile portfolios, the spread Table 3 between the leverage at the end of the period and the average leverage within the 20 period is even larger than in Table 2 , which causes an even more pronounced size eect. The estimated 60 is not able to explain the cross-section of returns across subdeciles. As visualized in Figure 3 , there is almost no relationship between 60 and stock returns. While excess returns increase from 1.001% to 1.400% per month, the betas increase only slighlty from 1.333 to 1.462. Table 2 is further split into ten subdeciles. Decile 1 contains the microcap firms with the smallest market value of equity, and decile 10 contains the microcap firms with the largest market value of equity. The blue circles depict the results based on 60 , the green asterisks those using the leverage correction, and the red crosses are the measured returns. For measured returns the error bars indicate the confidence interval of plus and minus one standard error. The four quadrants are organized as in Figure ( 3).
The spread between 60 and could be reduced by choosing a shorter estimation period for betas. However, there is a trade-o, as a shorter estimation period will also lead to greater estimation errors in the market model regressions. We propose a more convenient solution to reduce pricing errors. By applying equation (3), we correct the estimated beta for the spread between 60 and , thereby enhancing estimation accuracy by 21 accounting for the leverage at the end of the period. Table 2 and Figure   2 report the simulation results using our proposed correction of endogenous leverage changes during the beta estimation window. While the estimated betas are in line with the traditional betas for large rms, there are considerable deviations for small cap stocks. The estimated point-in-time betas, denoted as , lie well above the estimated coecients 60 for the two smallest decile portfolios, implying that the traditional beta estimation method causes a downward bias for these portfolios. In our simulation setup, this downward bias fully explains the size anomaly. Using the point-in-time betas corrects the bias, and the abnormal returns for the small decile portoios disappear. In fact, the pricing error, labeled ( ), becomes relatively small even for the two smalles decile portfolios. If the size eect is attributable to a misestimation of beta, the higher returns for small cap stocks come with higher beta risk. This nding also implies that an investment strategy based on the size eect will not produce any risk-adjusted outperformance.
A caveat with our method for beta correction is the assumption that the asset beta is constant during the estimation period. Moreover, many rms will also work with operating leverage for which, in principle, the same arguments can be made. 5 Firms with large xed costs and small variable costs, and hence high operating leverage, will suer losses in adverse market conditions. Lower sales will further increase the ratio between xed costs and variable costs, thereby increasing operating leverage. Again, one would expect that rms with negative prior asset returns will have a higher asset beta at the end of the estimation period than within the estimation period. Our correction does not account for this eect, and hence we may still underestimate the equity beta even after correcting for changes in nancial leverage.
In our simulation framework we keep the asset beta constant over time.
Nevertheless, even for market data we suggest that correcting for changes in nancial leverage during beta estimation period will lead to more precise beta estimates than without any such correction.
The eect of our correction is even more pronounced for the subdeciles of the smallest portfolios, as shown in Figure 3 . For these very small rms (microcaps) the standard beta has little explanatory power, while the pointin-time beta still tracks the observed returns. An exception is the smallest subdecile, where the expected return based on the point-in-time beta is higher 5 See Lev (1974) for the relationship between operating leverage and risk. Mandelker and Rhee (1984) report a correlation between financial and operating leverage. 22 than the measured return. We do not have an explanation for this apparent overestimation. However, one reason could be that both equation (1) and equation (2) are correct only in continuous time. Using them to forecast discrete period returns again leads to biased results because it implicitly assumes that the equity beta in equation (2) remains constant during the return measurment period subsequent to the beta estimation window. Our simulation indicates that this inaccuracy does not lead to a signicant bias in the case of risk-free debt as long the time period is short enough and the level of leverage is not too high. For the already highly leveraged rms, however, the point-in-time beta will not be constant during the period for which we estimate expected equity returns. If the rm does not default, its equity value sharply increases, the level of leverage decreases, and hence equation (3) will deliver an overestimated point-in-time betas for the smallest rms.
In the prior literature many explanations for the size eect have been proposed. Our approcah is novel in that it does not introduce any frictions to the CAPM such as trading costs, liquidity constraints, or irrational investors.
We also omit adding new risk factors, and hence covariance with the market portfolio is the only source of return. Indeed, we did not add any new tting parameters to align ex-ante and ex-post returns. Accordingly, we show that even in a frictionless mean-variance setup (in which the CAPM holds by denition), one should expect to observe a size eect if the beta is measured over a longer time window and hence does not reect the point-intime leverage of the rm.
Based on our simulation results, we suggest that any beta estimation needs to correct for leverage changes during the estimation window, and this is especially necessary if the beta of small stocks is estimated. Nevertheless, this eect need not to be, or even is unlikely to be, the only size-related factor that eects returns. In reality, there are frictions such as liquidity constraints, trading costs, information cost, estimation risk, and many other factors that may aect the return the marginal investor requires to hold a small rm in diversied porfolios. Our ndings merely indicate that none of these frictions are necessary for a size eect to show up given the standard beta estimation method.
Our ndings also have major implications for empirical corporate nance research. Any test of a rm's risk adjusted long-run performance after some nancing event simultaneously tests the validity of the expected return model (bad-model problem; Fama (1998) ). Given that the average beta is a biased estimate for the point-in-time beta, using this average beta will in itself pro-duce biased results. However, even using the point-in-time beta would not be accurate in long-run performance studies because the expected point-intime beta will change itself after the event due to return-induced changes in leverage. For example, if an event study identies two subsamples of positive and negative post-event returns, the average beta of the positive return subsample will drop over time, whereas the average beta of the negative return susample will increase over time. In standard event study methodology, the benchmark fails to incorporate these changes, which in turn leads to biased abnormal return estimates.
In addition, whenever a rm actively changes its capital structure, ceteris paribus, its point-in-time beta also changes. Analyzing capital structure changes in an event-study framework, e.g., the eect of share repurchases on subsequent stock returns, without adjusting the estimated betas appropriately will lead to biased results. For example, investigating the eect of share repurchases without adjusting for the resulting leverage increase, one would expect that the estimated betas are biased downwards. The bias will be more pronounced for rms that experience prior negative performance.
For example, Ikenberry et al. (1995) document high abnormal returns for value stocks and neutral performance for growth stocks after the repurchase.
They attribute this eect to undervaluation prior to the event. While their notion may be perfectly true, we argue that part of the eect they observe is attributable to a leverage-induced mismeasurement in betas.
Empirical results
In order to test our proposed method for beta correction with market data, our sample consists of all U.S. rm that are covered in the Compustat Global database within December 1988 to December 2007. Total return data and market values are taken from Thomson Datastream, and hence we need to exclude all rms without stock market data in this database. We also exclude nancial and utility rms because they dier in leverage from other rms.
In total, 2,932 rms remain in our sample. Total liabilities from Compustat Global are taken as our proxy for debt.
Our sample contains some rms that suer from thin trading. To address this issue, we use monthly returns and also exclude all rm months in which the rm has an equity return of zero or a market value of equity of less than USD 1 million at the beginning of the period. Ince and Porter (2006) report data quality problems in the Thompson Datastream return data, and hence we make all the corrections they suggest. This data cleaning step leads to a removal of 363 rm-months from our sample. Overall, the remaining sample consists of 447,019 rm-months. Table 4 provides a data description. As in the simulated returns, the average moments of the discrete equity returns, , , , are all positive. However, the historical returns are more skewed. The odd moments become negative for continuously compounded returns, and the eect is more pronounced for historical returns. A potential explanation is that the empirical leverage is somewhat higher than in our simulation framework.
Moment
, , , averages across all firms. They are normalized such that the standard deviation is always equal to one, which simplifies a comparison of the shape of the distributions.
, , are the continuously compounded asset returns, while , , and , are the discrete equity and market returns, respectively. , , and
, are the continuously compounded equity and market returns, respectively, which are calculated as = (1 + ). For the moment calculation all infinite equity returns are removed from the sample.
The moments of the market portfolios constructed from U.S. equity returns diers from the moments of our simulated market portfolio. In our simulation the returns of the market portfolio are close to a normal distribution for both discrete and continuous time returns. For the U.S. sample this is only true for the even moments, whereas the odd moments have negative loadings. In particular, a skewness of −0.493 represents a substantial deviation from normality. Again, this might be induced by somewhat higher leverage in the U.S. sample than in our simulated sample.
We again sort all rms into size decile portfolios, and the results are shown in Table 5 and in Figure 4 . As in our simulations, for the smallest (largest) ve decile portfolios the equity value is smaller (larger) at the end of the beta estimation window than during this window. Moreover, the results reveal two eects that are related to leverage. First, there is a clear negative correlation between size and leverage. Firms in the smallest decile portfolio have an average debt-to-equity ratio of 5.709, while rms in the largest decile portfolio have an average debt-to-equity ratio of 0.780 during the beta estimation window. However, this correlation between size and leverage is not enough by itself to conclude that there is a misestimation in beta; any increase in covariance with market returns due to higher leverage should already be reected in the estimated beta. Second, for rms in the smallest decile portfolios their leverage at the end of the estimation window is, on average, higher than during the estimation window. In decile 1 the dierence is even more than a factor of two. Ceteris paribus, we expect that this eect leads to an underestimation of the true point-in time beta if the beta is determined based on the prior 60 months window. 1 contains the firms with the smallest market value of equity, and decile 10 contains the firms with the largest market value of equity. is the average discrete excess equity return over the risk-free interest rate.
Returns are multiplied by 100. 60 denotes the beta estimated using the returns from the prior 60 months.
is the average point-in-time beta estimated according to equation (3), and is the corresponding asset beta. ∅ 60 (∅ 60 ) is the average leverage (equity value) during the beta estimation period, and ∅ The debt-to-equity ratio in the smallest portfolio (in decile 1) of U.S. rms is 13.7, which is much higher than the debt-to-equity ratio of 2.4 of the smallest portfolio in our simulation. Presumably, an explanation is our assumption of risk-free debt. High leverage increases the liquidation risk in our 26 simulation setup because instantaneous liquidation actually takes place. In reality, creditors will face a loss even on current accounts if the rm defaults, and hence liquidation takes place at some later stage, which in turn produces even higher levels of leverage. However, the debt-to-equity ratio shown in 30% even in the best case and much much smaller than the dierences in leverage, which increases by a factor of seven. This could partly be caused by a residual thin trading bias in the beta estimation. Although we use monthly returns and exclude months with a return of zero, residual thin trading is likely to persist. This will lead to a downward bias in the beta estimates especially for the smallest decile portfolio. In fact, the estimated betas in deciles one and two are even smaller than in decile 3 despite an increasing leverage, indicating a downward bias in these extreme deciles.
The results also shows a relationship between size and return. The return in the smallest portfolio (decile 1) is more than four times larger than in the largest portfolio (decile 10). This number should be interpreted with care because the sample probably suers from a survivorship bias. Our sample is created as an intersection of the Compustat Global and Datastream Thomson databases. Any missing data in either of the two sources will be missing in our sample, implying a combined bias that is even greater than the bias in each data source separately. Nevertheless, the size eect is much more pronounced than in our simulation, which we attribute partly to the higher debt-to-equity ratios in the U.S. sample. Table 4 also shows the results when we apply our proposed beta correction. The average asset betas estimated using equation (1) However, the asset betas are substantially lower for the smallest two decile portfolios with only 0.399 and 0.160, respectively. This potentially indicates that the betas of small rms are estimated too low, e.g., due to a thin-trading bias. Releveraging asset betas using equation (3) delivers substantially higher point-in-time betas, , for small cap stocks compared to the corresponding 60 estimates. Similar to our simulation results, 60 exhibits a downward bias as a proxy for the true beta at the end of the estimation window. Correcting for this bias reduces the risk-adjusted size eect. While the pricing error for small cap stocks is 2.05% per month if 60 is used to calculate the expected return, it reduces to 1.18% after the correction. The corresponding -value drops from 3.57 to 2.05, implying a lower signicance level of only 95% compared to 99.9%. Overall, our empirical ndings indicate that the size premium is substantially lower when beta is corrected for the market-induced changes in leverage. This implies that the high returns of small stocks are at least partly the result from higher nancial risk that investors take over.
Conclusions
Using simulation analyses, we document that even in a frictionless world a size eect exists for portfolios of rms grouped by the market value of equity.
This eect is caused by market-induced changes in leverage during the beta estimation window, which makes the estimated beta a biased proxy for the true point-in-time beta at the end of the estimation window. Firms that have suered from low equity returns during the beta estimation window exhibit, on average, higher leverage at the end of the estimation window than within. Accordingly, a measurement error occurs because this higher leverage is not reected in the estimated beta; in particular, the estimated beta is biased downwards for small rms. Using this beta to estimate riskadjusted returns will in turn lead to seemingly unexplained excess returns and pricing errors. We suggest a simple correction for this beta measurement error, which eliminates the size eect in simulated returns and greatly reduces it in historical returns for a sample of U.S. rms.
Our setup is very general, and our correction for the bias in estimated betas potentially explains many other CAPM anomalies. Another attractive feature of our approach is that we do not need to introduce frictions or additional risk drivers to the CAPM, and hence it requires fewer assumptions than previous explanations for CAPM anomalies. Finally, our ndings have implications for long-term events studies, as they are especially prone to measurement errors in expected returns. This is even more the case if the event triggers a change in capital structure. For example, not correcting for the increase in leverage induced by a share repurchase will underestimate expected returns, and hence it leads to the possibly wrong conclusion that rms that buy back shares subsequently experience higher risk-adjusted returns.
As another example, consider an investor who wants to pay a fund manager only for his value-added rather than for the risk he takes. The investor needs to make sure that the risk measure reects the point-in-time systematic risk rather the risk experienced in the past. Fund managers could try to exploit this eect and invest in rms that have experienced an increase in leverage during the contractually agreed beta estimation window.
